Circumstances in Which a Fee is an Excise Tax Entitled to Priority by Hammel, Valerie
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Bankruptcy Research Library Center for Bankruptcy Studies 
2018 
Circumstances in Which a Fee is an Excise Tax Entitled to Priority 
Valerie Hammel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
This Research Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Bankruptcy Studies at St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bankruptcy Research Library by an 
authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
selbyc@stjohns.edu. 

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
I.  Courts Have Discretion in Deciding What Constitutes an Excise Tax Under Section 
507.  
 
A. An Excise Tax Must Meet the “Functionality Test.” 
Generally, an obligation is a tax only if it is a “pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or 
property for the purpose of supporting the government.”3 Moreover, a tax is as an excise tax if it: 
(1) satisfies the general description of a tax; and (2) operates as a “‘tax’ (as distinct from a debt 
or penalty) for the purpose of setting the priority of a claim under the bankruptcy laws.”4  
The Supreme Court established the functionality test in CF&I to analyze the second 
prong of the excise tax standard.5 Under the functionality test, a courts will determine if an 
obligation is a tax by balancing its tax factors against its non-tax factors.6 Furthermore, an 
analysis should be “flexible enough to allow for consideration of any relevant factor.”7 Some 
factors courts consider include how the obligation is paid, applied, and reimbursed.8  
B. Courts Must Look Beyond a Statutory Label.  
 
Fees and penalties are not accorded priority under the Bankruptcy Code, even if a statute 
labels them as excise taxes. “Many types of excise taxes are similar to fees and many are 
described in the statutes creating them as fees, thus making it necessary for courts to distinguish 
between obligations that are truly excise taxes and those that are considered to be fees.”9  
Additionally, a fee is generally incurred to receive a benefit that is not evenly distributed 
or shared with other members of society. It is the result of a voluntary act, unlike taxes, which 
                                                
3 See New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906). 
4 U.S. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., (“CF&I”), 518 U.S. 213, 220 (1996). 
5 See id. at 224. 
6 See id. at 224-26. 
7 Id. at 255.   
8 See In re United Healthcare System, Inc., 396 F.3d 247, 255 – 258 (3d Cir. 2005). 
9 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 507.11 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2018); see also In re 
Cassidy, 983 F.2d 161, 161-62 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding an exaction was a penalty despite being labeled as a tax in 
the Internal Revenue Code); In re Marcucci, 256 B.R. 685, 695 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) (holding a DMV surcharge 
was not a tax even though it had tax-like characteristics because its purpose was to penalize poor driving); In re 
Chesteen, No. 17-11472, 2018 WL 878847, at *3 (E.D.L.A. 2018) (holding the Affordable Care Act individual 
mandate was a penalty because it had more non-tax factors designed to expand healthcare coverage). 
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are involuntary.10 In general, “a ‘fee’ connotes a ‘benefit’” for the debtor whereas a tax can be 
imposed arbitrarily and in “disregard [of] benefits bestowed by the Government” as a function of 
the legislature’s constitutional grant of tax power.11 Penalties are also the result of a voluntary, 
albeit unlawful, act.12  
C. Excise Taxes Must Serve a Public Purpose. 
 
Ultimately, “the chief distinction is that a tax is an exaction for public purposes while a 
fee relates to an individual privilege or benefit to the payer.”13 Fees are meant to defray the cost 
of government, whereas taxes are meant to support the government.14 The River Coal court 
illustrated how excise taxes serve a public purpose by describing the difference between a 
professional license and a reclamation fee.15 Licensing charges incurred in connection with a 
professional license to practice medicine or a permit to conduct a broadcast station are fees 
because they do not serve a public purpose; they instead benefit the license or permit holder by 
allowing the holder to engage in particular conduct.16 A mine reclamation fee, in contrast, is a 
tax because it is involuntarily imposed for the public purpose of restoring land resources 
damaged by mining activity, and is imposed on top of the permits that mine operators already 
own in order to conduct mining activity.17  
Analyzing an obligation’s functional public purpose unearths complications when the 
obligation is imposed on public sector organizations, such as hospitals. It begets the question of 
whether a debtor satisfies the public purpose of an excise tax analysis by virtue of operating in 
the public sector. For instance, Boston Regional exemplifies the broad scope of what courts 
                                                
10 See National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 370 (1974). 
11 Id. at 340-41. 
12 See CF&I, 518 U.S. at 226. 
13 United States v. River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984). 
14 See id. at 1106. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
consider public purposes for excise taxes under the Bankruptcy Code.18 The hospital in Boston 
Regional argued that an obligation mandated under Massachusetts law was not an excise tax, but 
rather a regulatory fee, because the hospital voluntarily chose to operate as an acute hospital for 
its own benefit.19 The court, however, held that the fee was a tax because it served the ultimate 
public purpose of paying for uninsured, low-income residents.20  
II.  Jurisdictions Vary in what Factors to use in an Excise Tax Analysis.  
 
A. Courts Have Discretion on What Standards to Apply.  
  
Courts have significant discretion to determine what constitutes a “public purpose,” and 
in turn the discretion to determine what constitutes an excise tax.21 Such discretion, however, 
makes excise tax classification one of “the most frequently litigated issue[s] under section 
507(a)(8)(E).”22 Indeed, how broadly Section 507(a)(8)(E) excise taxes are interpreted impacts 
the availability of funds to other creditors.23  
In the Ninth Circuit, “a five-part test has emerged [to determine] what constitutes a § 
507(a)(8)(E) priority excise tax” in what is known as the “Lorber” standard.24 The Lorber 
standard provides: (1) the fee is an involuntary pecuniary burden, regardless of name, laid upon 
an individual or property; (2) the fee is imposed by or under the authority of the legislature; (3) 
the fee is for public purposes; (4) the fee is imposed under the police or taxing power of the state; 
and (5) whether a private creditor similarly situated to the government can be hypothesized under 
the relevant statute.25  
                                                
18 See Boston Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Massachusetts Div. of Health Care Finance and Policy, 365 F.3d 51, 
60 (1st Cir. 2004). 
19 See id. at 56. 
20 See id. at 60-61. 
21 See In re Intern. Tobacco Partners, Ltd., 468 B.R. 582, 596–597 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
22 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 507.11. 
23 See Suburban II, 36 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 1994). 
24 In re Carpenter, 540 B.R. 691, 699 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015). 
25 See In re Lorber Indus. of California, 564 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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The Sixth Circuit added two more factors to the Lorber standard to narrow the scope of 
the public purpose prong: (1) whether the exaction is universally applied to all similarly situated 
entities; and (2) whether the granting of priority status to a governmental claimant would 
prejudice private creditors with like claims.26  
 In contrast to the Lorber standard, many other courts have simply adopted the Black’s 
Law Dictionary definition of the term “excise tax.”27 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “excise 
tax” as follows:  
A tax imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the 
enjoyment of a privilege. A tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods or on the 
carrying on of an occupation or activity, or a tax on the transfer of property. In 
current usage the term has been extended to include various license fees and 
practically every internal revenue tax except the income tax.28 
 
B. There Are Similarities Among the Different Standards. 
The courts generally agree as to certain factors that should be considered regardless of the 
standard ultimately applied. For instance, courts uniformly consider whether an obligation is 
involuntary applied.29 Also, considerable deference is given to whether an obligation has a public 
purpose.30 The public purpose does not even have to be the primary purpose of the obligation. 
Indeed, an obligation can still be considered an excise tax so long as it furthers the public 
purpose to some extent.31  
 
                                                
26 See In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 36 F.3d 484, 488-89 (6th Cir. 1994). 
27 In re National Steel Corp., 321 B.R. 901, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); In re Trism, Inc., 311 B.R. 509, 516 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 2004); In re Voightman, 236 B.R. 878, 881-82 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999); In re Chateaugay Corp., 153 B.R. 
632, 638 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
28 Black’s Law Dictionary 563 (6th ed. 1990). 
29 See Lorber, 564 F.3d at 1067. 
30 See id. 
31 See In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc., 126 B.R. 312, 323 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (holding assessments against the 
Chapter 7 hospital were excise taxes because they furthered the public interest despite being enacted to primarily 
offset regulatory costs). 
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Additionally, legislative intent behind a statutorily imposed obligation is commonly 
analyzed.32 If the legislative intent is determined to further the public interest, courts are more 
likely to consider the obligation an excise tax because promoting the public interest is understood 
to be “the purpose of Congress in providing for priorities in bankruptcy.”33  
III. An Excise Tax is Only Given Priority Status if it is a Tax on a Discrete Transaction.  
 
Not all excise taxes are entitled to priority status. The excise tax must also be leveraged 
on a discrete transaction.34 The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not define “discrete 
transaction.” Thus, courts analyze the case law for guidance.35 In interpreting precedent, courts 
embrace either a broad or narrow perspective.36  
 Courts that adopt a broad interpretation of Section 507 do not limit transactions to 
“separate and distinct acts or specific taxable events.”37 They hold that a “broad construction [of 
a transaction] is consistent with the legislative intent in providing priorities under § 507.”38 
Indeed, the legislative underpinning of the excise tax priority is to compensate taxing authorities 
for being involuntarily creditors.39 Therefore, a wide variety of activities are held to be discrete 
transactions, such as operating an automobile, executing a contract, driving a truck on a public 
highway, and employing a worker.40  
                                                
32 See In re Ridgecrest Healthcare, Inc., 571 B.R. 838, 843 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding the statutorily labeled 
fees were excise taxes because they supported California’s Medicaid program, but only after analyzing the 
legislative history of the applicable state law). 
33 New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Fund, 886 F.2d 714, 720 (4th Cir. 1989). 
34 See § 507(a)(8)(e)(ii). 
35 See In re National Steel Corp. 321 B.R. at 911. 
36 See In re Ridgecrest Healthcare, Inc., 571 B.R. at 845 (holding that the Ninth Circuit case law suggests adopting a 
narrow view of a “discrete transaction” after considering broader interpretations adopted by some other circuits). 
37 In re National Steel Corp., 321 B.R. at 911. 
38 Id. at 909; see also In re Groetken, 843 F.2d 1007, 1014 (7th Cir. 1988). 
39 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 507.11. 
40 See In re National Steel Corp., 321 B.R. at 911 (collecting cases). 
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Moreover, courts in jurisdictions that adopt a broad interpretation may even hold 
“discrete transaction” to include multiple transactions.41 In effect, affording flexibility to courts 
in deciding how many transactions can comprise a “discrete transaction” helps the government 
recover on excise claims in more circumstances.42  
Finally, many other courts have adopted a narrow interpretation of the term “transaction” 
by using the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Driving the notion of a strict statutory 
interpretation and limited grant of priority is that “every such claim reduces the fund available to 
general creditors.”43 For example, the In re Albion Health Services court determined that 
unemployment and wage related taxes fall within the ambit of Section 507 because Congress 
specifically drafted that category into the statute.44 A strict statutory interpretation of “discrete 
transaction” can be further strengthened when the transaction at issue is explicitly addressed in 
another related statute.45 In effect, creditors who reference a specific provision in the Bankruptcy 
Code in jurisdictions that interpret Section 507 narrowly, such as the Ninth Circuit, will be more 
likely to succeed on priority claims.46  
Conclusion 
 
An obligation that is an excise tax on a discrete transaction is entitled to priority under the 
Bankruptcy Code. However, the Bankruptcy Code does not define the circumstances that give 
rise to an excise tax or discrete transaction. Courts accordingly have broad discretion to 
determine how to define those terms. Nevertheless, legislative intent and public policy play a 
                                                
41 See In re Rizzo, 741 F.3d 703, 706 (6th Cir. 2014); see also In re National Steel Corp., 321 B.R. at 909. 
42 See In re Perry, 521 B.R. 370, 379 (holding multiple transactions in a medical practice, from treating patients to 
paying employees, to collectively be a “transaction”); see also Quiroz v. Michigan, Dept. of Treasury, 472 B.R. 434, 
439 (holding a bundle of financial transactions to be a “transaction” since the legislature acknowledged that business 
necessarily covers a series of transactions). 
43 Suburban II, 36 F.3d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 1994). 
44 See In re Albion Health Services, 339 B.R. 171, 179 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). 
45 See id. (holding that the obligation was an excise tax under the Bankruptcy Code because language in the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act corroborated that designation). 
46 See In re Ridgecrest Healthcare 571 B.R. at 845. 
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substantial role in all excise tax analyses. The ability of governmental entities to receive priority, 
and the funds that remain available for other creditors, will continue to hinge on how broadly a 
court interprets Section 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.  
 
